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A RECONSIDERATION OF THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT 
THE ORDER OF THE CHAPTERS OF THE PRAMANA VARTTIKA 
The Argu1nent by Indian Co1n1nentators of Dhannakfrti* 
by 
Motoi Ono, Tsukuba 
゜. Introduction As is well known, the first chapter of the P闊 fl泊nav函ttika,the main work of Dharmakrrti, is the 
Sviirthiinwniina, whereas the same chapter is located after the P1atyak5a-chapter in his other 
works and the P1amii1Jasa111ucxaya of Dignaga. This strange order of the chapters of the P1a1nふ
りavarttikahas been variously discussed and interpreted by modern scholars as well as Indian 
and Tibetan commentators. As for the historical fact, however, there is, in my opinion, no rea-
son to suspect the conclusion of the majority of the modern scholars that the Svarthiinwniina 
was first written and located at the top of the work by the author.' 
Modern scholars also have considered the interpretations of the issue of the strange order by 
the commentators of the P1ama1Javarttika since Prof. Stcherbatsky.2 To be sure, we cannot ex-
pect too much of the commentators in elucidating the historical fact about this issue.3 But apart 
from the historical fact, it is significant to investigate the interpretations by Dharmakrrti-com-
mentators. Itis because differences among the interpretations of this issue by the commentators 
must be a crucial point for understanding the historical development of the Buddhist logico-
epistemological school. Prof. Stcherbatsky was certainly well aware of this point of view.4 
Prof. van der Kuijp and Prof. Kimura, based on their researches about Tibetan sources, also 
pointed out the significance of recognizing the difference among the interpretations of this is-
sue by Dharrnakrrti-commentators.5 I think, however, we have not yet sufficiently inquired into 
the argument by Indian commentators itself. Therefore, I would reconsider the controversy 
among Dharmaki"rti-cornmentators about the order of the chapters of the P1a111fi1Javiirttika by 
tracing their argument in their own literature, and give some materials for elucidating the his-
・ I am obliged to Prof. Sh61-yu Katsura and Prof. Tom J.F. Tilernans for their valuable comments and suggestions. I 
am also very grateful to Prof. Nobuhiro Kaga and Prof. Joseph Johnson who kindly corrected my English. 
1 Cf. Frauwallner、E.(1954), "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dhannak11ti's", in Asfr1tica, Festschrifi 
Friedrich Weller zum 65. Gebwtstag, Leipzig, 142-154; The Pramat1avii1ttikam uf Dhan1aki1t1'. the fi1:5t chapter with 
the autucummenta,y. R. Gnoli (ed.), Roma, 1960, Introduction; Nagasaki, H. (1969) "Pramauava,tflka ltahiry6-sh6 
no Jun・ i [The place of the Svii,thiinumiina-chapter of the Prami(la亙ltika]＂、 BukkyugakuSeminii 10, 18-30; 
Sva,t屈numiinaparicchedaby Dhannaki11,: D.Malvania (ed.), Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series、
Vol. 1、Introduction.
2 Cf. Stcherbatsky 1932: 38f. 
i Cf. Frauwallner 1954: 143. 
4 Cf. Stcherbatsky 1932: 4f. 
Cf. Kuijp 1979; Kimura, S. (1988),'"Ryohyoshaku'no sho no junjo nitsuite [On the order of the chapters of the 
Pmit1avi1tika] (1)", Komazawa-Daigaku Bukkyu-!!akubu RunshiJ 19, (40)-(49); Kimura, S. (1989)、＇"Ryohyか
shaku'no sho no junjo ni tsuite [On the order of the chapters of the P1ami!wvi1tika] (2)", Kumazawa-Daigaku 
BukkyかgakubuKenkyiJ-k1yc:J 47, (18)-(29) 
.. 
702 M. Ono 
tori cal development of the Indian Buddhist logico-epistemological school after DharmakTrti. 
According to Prof. Stcherbatsky, DharmakTrti-commentators can be divided into three 
branches, namely the philological, the philosophical and the religious school.(， Concerning our 
problem, the argument was basically carried out between the philological and the religious 
school. 7 Strictly speaking, the argument is not even the controversy between two schools. It is 
8 rather a criticism by the religious school, especially by Jayanta (=rGyal ba can)," of the philol-
ogical school's interpretation. It is well known that Tibetan scholars regard him as the repre-
sentative who asserted that the P闊 mauasiddhishould be the first chapter of the PramiiJJaviirtti-
ka, contrary to the philological school, which asserted that the strange order must be accepted 
as it is.9 I therefore attempt here to trace the development of the argument, focusing on the 
statement of Jayanta. The text of Jayanta extant only in Tibetan translation is, however, quite 
difficult to understand because of its obscure translation. Therefore, in order to make clear the 
context of Jayanta's text, first I would closely investigate interpretations by the philological 
school, because it is probably the object of Jayanta's criticism. Then, I would deal with inter-
pretations by the religious school, especially with Jayanta's view. 
1. The philological school's interpretation 
1.1. Devendrabuddhi's view 
At first, Devendrabuddhi, a direct pupil of DharmakTrti and the earliest commentator of the 
Pram攻78砥dtikabelonging to the philological school, refers to this problem of the order of the 
chapters at the beginning of al three chapters of his commentary, the Paun取1aviirthkapaiijikii, 
as follows・ 
1) "Having established the inference, which is the ground for the explanation of 
the treatise defining valid cognition, b;tthe teacher~瑣坦~ [DharmakTrti] be-
． ） 
gins the explanation of the Mangala-verse, a chief subject by [the statement:] 
'valid cognition'etc. 9 9 1 (）
2) "Having established in advance the inference, which is the ground for the ex-
planation of the treatise dehning valid cognition転叫年l向 Dignaga,and 
finished the explanation ofthe first half [ofthe first Mangala-vers吋下= he
latter half of the first Mangala-verse of the treatise composed by the teacheJ is 
easy to understand, then, in order to explain the definition of valid cognition, 
唸-ャ¥DharmakTrti]began [the explanation by. the statement:]'because the object of 
(.Cf. Stcherbatsky 1932: 39ff. To reconsider the validity of this clasification and naming、probablydepending on 
some Tibetan sources、isone of the objects of this paper, but I follow his way tentatively. 
Those who belong to the philosophical schol, with the exception of Satikarananda, did not discuss this isue, be-
cause they did not compose the co111enta1-y on the P,a11arava1tika. Satikarananda's interpretation is not so original, 
as we se later 
We have until now caled him'Jina・, but the present writer proved that his original name should be'Jayanta彎． See
Ono, M. (1993), P,aj1ika,aguptas Erk!.釘ungder DefInition gi/lger Erkenntnis (Pl.am珈直,1rikala'!1karazu Pramか
nav印tikaI l-7). 2 Vols. (Disertation, University of Vienna), Einleitung, vii-x 
りCf.Stcherbatsky 1932: 44; Gnoli 1 %0: Introduction, xv-xvii 
11 Cf. slub upon pyis-tshad ma・; mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa・; rpyu,Jes su dpag p,1 ma11 pa,加hagnas 
,kabs su bab pa tshad ma 7.hes bya ba la sags pas phy、?g'tshalba ・,・tsh佐'ssu bead pa'i bshad pa 11cf7,acf par 1tso11 
pa ・u I rv r 1 b 1 f.
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valid cognition is twofold', etc."11 
3) "The inference is twofold. For oneself and for others. Between these, on the 
subject of the inference for oneself, [Dharmakfrti] explained it in advance. There-
fore, [I] don't explain [it] here. The necessity for the reversion of the order [of the 
chapters] has already been explained [in the above two places]."12 
703 
Here, Devendrabuddhi apparently regards the Sviirthiinwnana as the first chapter, and recog-
nizes this order as strange. He, however, defends this strange order. Namely, he considers that 
the normal order was reversed because the Sviirthiinumiina-chapter establishing the inference is 
the ground for explaining the whole of the P1c11取wsamuccayaby Dignaga. 
1.2. Sakyabuddhi's elaboration 
Sakyabuddhi, the author of the subcommentary to both Dharmakfrti's Pran1ii(laviirttikasvavrtti 
and Devendrabuddhi's Pram初avfirttikapanj1kii,and the most influential person of the philol-
ogical school, basically follows the interpretation by his predecessor, Devendrabuddhi, and 
elaborates on it. Sakyabuddhi's important references to the problem of the order of the chapters 
are found in the Svarthiinumiina-and the Pramii(lasidd/n:..chapter of his Pramii{JaViirttika/ikii.11 
At first, let us examine the statement in the Svarthfinumiina-chapter of his commentary. This 
statement concerns the interpretation of the first sentence of the Pramii(la噸rttikasvavrti. There, 
Dharmakfrti says: 
"The distinction between the rational and the irrational (art/頑nartha)depends on 
the inference. Therefore, in order to establish this [inference], [the author] bas ex-
plained [the inference], because there is misunderstanding concerning this [very 
inference]. 1114 
Sakyabuddhi interprets this sentence as follows: 
"Therefore, one must explain [this sentence] in a different manner. [The word:] 
'artha'means the definition of valid cognition accomplished by Dignaga, because 
[his definition] is rational. [The word:]'anartha'means [the one, which] is made 
by the heretic, because [it] is irrational.'To distinguish'these two means to distin-
guish the rational one from the irrational one.'Because this [ distinction, however] 
depends on the inference', one should ascertain whether the defining words are ra-
tional or irrational, by means of depending on the inference, but not depending on 
the direct perception, because the [later] doesn't make any judgement. If one says 
that the definition of the inference has already been explained [by Dignaga ],
[Dharmakfrti] says'because there is misunderstanding concerning this'. [Namely] 
because there is the ignorance of this inference, the author of the treatise [i.e., 
1 Cf. slob dpon gy,:,; !shad ma・; mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa・; rgyu zjes su dpag pa sngar mam rar g7.hag pa 
dang/ slob dpon gy,:s-gsungs pa bstan bcos kyi dang [JU phyag'tshal ba ・;tsh佐'ssu bead p、1・; rhyed ・og ma,togs sla 
ba nyid kyiphyirphyed駆'ongma ny,d kyi bshad pa yangs su rd7.ogs par mdwd nas / datshad ma・; mtshan nyid ky, 
bshad pa md7.ad pa'iphyir/ gzhal bya gnyis phyir zhes bya ba la sags pa b,tsams pa yin n()／/rvr 122a4ff 
12 Cf.zies SU dra訂'rani mam pa gny,:,; te I rang gi don dang g7han gyi don to I de la'dir rang pi dun gyi zjes su dpaど
ra ・;skabs su bab pa las I desngar bstan 7.in pa de /tar na mi'chad ci() ／/go rims b7.log pa ・;dg()．s-pa ni snp1r bstan 7.in 
(() ／PVP 268b6f. 
1 Inthe P詞 rthanumiina-chapterof his commentary, he also refers to this isue (cf. PV丁(Ne)252a4「f.)See in f,a 
note 25 
1,l Cf. al1/1/inarthavivecanasyi'inumini.frayatvit tadv1prat1pates tadvyavasthipani_yiha. PVSV 1,8 
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Dharmakfrti]'has explained'[it]'in order to establish this', namely in order to 
establish the inference by means of removing misunderstanding. Thus, when one 
depends on the inference, and then explains the meaning of the P.闊 l]］jjpasamucca-
ya, there [can] be the misunderstanding concerning this very [inference]. There-
fore, [DharmakTrti] first of al established this very [inference]. [DharrnakTrti] ex-
plained [in such a way]. [Deve叫rabuddhi]will explain [it] in the same way at the 
beginning of the second chapter [of his commentary]:'having established the in-
ference, which is the ground for the explanation of the treatise defining valid 
cognition by the teacher [Dignaga]'etc."15 
Here, Sakyabuddhi relates Dharmakfrti's statement at the beginnin~ of his Pran1iiraviirttika-
'sv、1vrttito the problem of the order of the chapters. According to Sakyabuddhi,'the rational 
one'in this statement means the definition of valid cognition by Dignaga, namely the content 
of the Pramarasamuccaya. According to him, therefore, DharmakTrti himself states here that 
the Sviirthiinumiina-chapter explaining the inference is at the top because it is the ground for 
explaining Dignaga's Pram初asamuccaya.By means of interpreting DharmakTrti's statement in 
such a way, he tries to confirm the Devendrabuddhi's interpretation that the S噸rtl厄nul]沿nais 
the first chapter because it is the ground for explaining Dignaga's Pram初asamuccaya.This 
idea by Sakyabuddhi has had a great inf1uence upon those who discuss the problem of the chap-
ters of the Pramiinavarttika after him. 
We can also find such interpretation by Sakyabuddhi in his statement at the beginning of the 
Pramarasiddh,~chapter of his commentary: 17 
1~ Cf. de /ta bas na g7han du ma111 par bshacl par bya ste / don ni ~s mdzad pa'i tshad 
ma・; mtshan nytd la sags pa yin te rigs pa dang ldan p,1'i phyir ro I don ma yin pa ni 11u steg ky,~i; byas pa yin te I rigs 
pa dang 11i ldan pa'i phy,i・,v I de gny ,~i; roam par'byed pa ni rigs pa dang ldan pa dang I rigs pa dang mi ldan pa 
nyid du mam par j'og pa'o I de ni J°es su dpag pa la brten pa yin pa'i phyir le I zjes su（加'!:Jpa kho na la b,tan nas 
mtshan nyid kyi tshig ma111s rigs pa dang ldan pa dang I rigs pa dang mi ldan pa nyid du mam par gzlwg par bya ba 
yin gyi I mnどonsum la bl1en nas ni 11a yin te I de ni ma111 par dpyod par byed pa ma yin pa・; phyir ro I gal te zjes su 
dpag pa・; 111tshan nyid ni bshad ?in to zhe na I de las log par rtog pas 7/,es bya ba smos te I zjes su dpag pa de la 
nnongs pas de roam par gzhag pa'i phyir zjes su dpag pa de log par t1og pa bs,1 bas ma111 par g7hag pa・; phyi「bstan
bcos mdzad pas bshad pa ・o I'di skad du gang gi phy,i-,Jes su dpag pa la b,ten nas I~·; don 
bshad par bya ba yin na de la yang log par,tog pa yod pa de'i phyir re sing de nyid mam pargzhag go 7hes bshad pa 
yin te I de skad du rab tu byed pa gny1'.i; b1tsom pa n,1 yang slob dpon gyis !shad ma'i mtshan nyid bshad pa'i rgyu 
des su dpag pa roam par gzhag nas zhes bya ha la sogs pa d,ad pat・辺)'Urro I PVT(Je) 5b7ff. See also Kuijp 1979 
15 
'（， E.g. Sarikarananda corn men tson the same sentence of Dharmakir1i as follows: "In this [P1amfiuava1ttika], one can 
also find the comment on the treatise [which states:]'who became the means of valid cognition・ etc. Therefore、[the
f'ramfiravfi1ttika] is a commentary on the f'ramfirasamuccaya. Never1heless, it is not unjust that [Dharmaki叫，
having abandoned the order of [the charters of] this [Pramarasamuccaya]、firstexrlains the inference by [the state-
ment :]'a rroper1y of the subject'etc. In order to show this、[Dharmakir1i]exrlains the necessity [of the reversion of 
the orde「]by means of the comment'attha and'etc.'a,tha'means [something] of which nature is an absolute real 
being.'ana,tha'means the counterpart of this. [Namely it means] relative real being such as colour-shape (*n1p<1) 
etc.、orunreal being such as the rri111ary matter(* pradhana), God (* Nva「a)and the horns of a hare etc." (cf.'di, 
y、?ng!shad mar gyur pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa'ig7hung gi grel pardmigs pa'iphyi「Tshadma kun /as blus pa'l.gle/ 
pa yin yang de・; rim pa dar le phyogs chos 7hes bya ba la sags pas cic1ng par zjes su dpaiJ pa bり()dpa gang yin pa de 
mi ng.s paI llll.gyul bal bya ba'iphyi「'grelpas（なospa bshad pa ni don dang 7hes bya ba la sags pa yin nu I don ni 
dun dam paryud pa・; ngu bu ・o I don ma yin pa ni de las bzlug paste I g7ugs la sags pa kun rd7ub tu yod pa ・an, I 
!:?fso bu dang dban!:? phyu!:? dang ri bun!:? gi rva la sugs pa med pa nyid du I PVTsa,1 4a4 f.) See also Kuijr 1979: 15 
As foI this paragl aph、Prof.Steinkellner found some i111ro11ant fragments in Arpendix I inR. Saq,k!1yayana's ed1-
tion of Manorathanandin's P1an1iiravi1tikav:rti(1. See Steinkellner, E. (1980), "Philological Remarks on Sakyarnati's 
Pramar:,avarttika¥ika", Gedenkschrifl伽 LudwigAlsclurf, Wiesbaden, 283-295 
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"In order to explain the relationship between the first and the second chapter indi-
rectly by means of posing question and answer, [Devendrabuddhi] states'by the 
teacher', etc. There [ can be] the following question: If the very [ I'ramiilJasa1nucca-
ya] should be explained because the teacher Dharmakfrti [intends to] make a com-
mentary on this treatise, the PramiiJJasamuccaya, why did he establish the defini-
tion of the inference first independently?'8 The objection to this [question] is [the 
statement:]'The explanation of the treatise defining valid cognition by the 
teacher', etc. Here'the teacher'means Dignaga because it is his treatise that 
[Dharmakfrti] will explain. [The word:]'by the teacher'means'his'.'The treatise 
defining valid cognition'is the treatise by which one defines valid cognition, 
namely the direct perception and the inference. Itmeans the I'ramiilJasamuccaya. 
(This is] a treatise with clear words, which destroys the heretical opponent and de-
livers (the叫 fromthe ignorance. [This sentence is] a determinative compound 
[which can be analyzed] as follows: this is [written]'by the teacher'and is'the 
treatise defining valid cognition'as well. Even if there are the * Vinaya/ikii, etc. 
[written]'by the teacher', (they are] not'the treatise defining valid cognition'. [On 
the other hand] even if there is'the treatise defining valid cognition', which is 
written by other people than him, [they are] not [written]'by the teacher'. There-
fore, both [attributes] are said.'The explanation'means that one explains (the 
treatise] definitely, after [he] removed the wrong explanations by the commenta-
tors prior to him and the misunderstanding by the heretic.'The ground'for this 
[explanation] is'the inference'. Namely, the explanation is characterized by the 
distinction between the rational and the irrational one. This [ distinction] depends 
on the inference, because [the former] is necessarily accompanied by conceptual 
construction. Therefore, [Dharmakfrti]'established'the very [inference] at first, 
because it necessarily becomes a means [ ofthe explanation of the treatise defining 
valid cognition]. Even if the teacher Dignaga has already defined the inference, 
there is no error [in saying that Dharmakfrti established the inference] because (he] 
established [it] by modifying [Dignaga's definition] fundamentally. 
There is [ another] question: In the first chapter of the Pram取18噸rttJka[i.e., the 
Svみthiinwniina],[DharmakTrti] freely commented on the Sviirthiinumiina-chapter 
of the I'ramiilJasa1nuccaya by means of refuting different opinions. Why did he 
[nevertheless] make [the commentary] literally in this [P1c11初asiddhi-chapter]by 
refuting [different opinions]? Therefore, [Devendrabuddhi] says'by the teacher', 
etc.'The treatise defining [ something]'means the treatise by which the [five] 
constituent elements of being, the [ eighteen] elementary spheres and the [twelve] 
places [etc.] are defined. [In this case, the compound:]'pramaualak~rnlJasiistra' 
means what is both'valid cognition'because of trustworthiness and'the treatise 
defining [something]'. It means the Buddha's word. The ground for the explana-
tion of the [Buddha's word] is'the ground for the explanation of valid cognition 
a叫 thetreatise defining [something]'. It is an appositional compound(* kannadhふ
raya), which means what is [written]'by the teacher', and is'the grou叫 forthe 
explanation of valid cognition and the treatise defining [something]'. What is (this 
ground]? [It is]'the inference'. [Here]'the inference'means the Sviirth/inum/ina-
chapter of the Pran泊:uasamuccaya,because it explains the inference. Thus, having 
IX (fangpul rang dbang邸 i,:icliv utkramya Skt. unce1ain [neglecting the fi内t[chapter]. See Steinkelner 19RO: n. 32
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depended on the inference, [Dharmakfrti] will explain [later] 19 that the word of the 
Lord is rational, but [the word of] the other, the heretic's one, is not [rational]. 
Thus, [this] explanation [ of the sentence20] is different [ from the first explanation]. 
Also [in this case, however] this inference is examined at the s~みthanumiina­
chapter [ of the Pramiil}asamuccaya]. Therefore, [Dharmakfrti] explained in ad-
vance the very Sva「thiinun沿na-chapterof the P1・amli{Jasamuccayaby means of re-
futing different opinions. 
121 
In this long paragraph, Sakyabuddhi shows two different interpretations of the first sentence of 
Devendrabuddhi's first statement we investigated above. In the first interpretation, Sakyabuddhi 
follows Devendrabuddhi and elaborates his view as he did in the Sviirthiinumana-chapter of his 
commentary. Namely, he considers that the Sviirthiinlll]沿11ais the first chapter because the 
inference is the ground for the explanation of the Pramiil}asa1nuccaya. In the second 
interpretation, however, he brings forward another remarkable view. Namely, he says that the 
Sviirthiinumana is the first chapter because the inference is the ground for the explanation of 
'the Buddha's word'. Further, he asserts that Dharmakfrti, having depended on the inference, 
indicates that the Buddha's word is rational. He seems to consider that the inference as valid 
cognition is more fundamental than the Buddha as valid cognition. We can, to be sure, find the 
19 I think it refers to PV I284-285 
2(I Namely、thesentence: slob dpon g_y/S'tshad nw ・;mtshan nyicf kyi bstan bcos bshad pa・; rgyu zjes su dpag pa I PVP 
I b If.
Cf.,go! ba dang Ian bstan pa・; zur gy,s le ・u dang po dang gny,~.,-pa・,・ 囀brelpa bstan pa ・;phyir I slob dpon gyis zhes 
bya ba la soど.,pa sn10s te I de la gal te ~' i bstan bcos ~ mam pa, 
bshad par bzhed pa yin pas de nyid bshad par bya ba yin na I ci'i phy,i・ dang po「l.angdbang giS l].es su dpag pa.l 
mtshan nyid mam par gzhag pa mdzad ces bya ba nanどな()Iba'o!/slobdpon gyis !shad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan 
bcos bshad pa'i zhes bya ba la sags pa ni'di'i Ian yin no I'dir slob dpon ni ~yin pa「'dadde I 
de・; bstan bcos bshad par'gyur ba nyid yin pa・; phy1i-ro I de・; don ni slob dpon gyi ・o I bstan bcos gang g,~5 mngon 
sum dang,Jes su dpag pa・; tshad ma mtshon par byed pa de ni I !shad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos te I ~ 
~zhes bya'o I mu stegs kyi dgra'chos shing mi shes pa las skyob pa・; phyir nges pa・; tshig gi tslwl gy, 
bstan bじosso I slob dpon gyi yang de yin la !shad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos kyang yin pas zhes bya ban, 
khyad par gyi bsdu pa ・o I slob dpon gyi ~ ・バifs.la sags pa yod mod kyil !shad ma 'imtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos 
ma yin no I de las gzhan pas byas pa・; !shad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos yod mod kyil slob dpon gyi ma yin 
no I de bas na gnyi ga smos so I de・; sngar gyi fik byed pa'imam par bshad pa ngan pa dang I mu stegs byed ky, 
11sod ngan bsal nas khyad par du bshad pa ni mam par bshad pa ・o I de'i rgyu niりessu dpag pa ・o I de ltar na di()17 
dang don ma yin pa rnam par'phyed pa・; mtshan nyid can ni bshad pa y1i1 no I de'i yan,ど,Jessu dpag pa,ten yin le 
mam par 1()g pa dang bcas pa ny,d kyi phyir ro I de bas na tlwbs su gyur pa ny1d kyi phyir de ny,d dang p()rmam 
par gzhag pa yin no I gal te ~s,Jes su dpag pa・; mtshan nyicf mdzad pa de lta na yang 
1gyas par rnam par dkrugs nas rnam pargzhag pa delta na skyon yod pa ma yin no I 
TShad ma mam泣[E_le ・u dang par~'i rang gi don gyi,Jes su dpag pa・; le ・u,tsod ngan 
Ian btab pa・; sgo nas don gy,:., ma111 par bslwd 1ws I de la ci ・;phyir rim pa las,gal nas mdzad ces bya ba ・;rlsod pa'（カ
la I de・; f)hyir slob dpon gyis zhes bya ba la sags pa sn10s te I bstan bcos gang gic, phung po dang khams danど／skye
ma ched mtshon par byed pa de ni mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos so /I mi slu ba nyid kyi phyir tshad ma yang de yin la I 
mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos yang yin pas na I !shad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos te I sangs,gyas kyi bka ・ 7応
bya ba ・;don to /I de'i bshad ()a・;,gyu ni tshad ma'i mtshao nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa'i rgyu ・o I slob dpon gyi 
yang de yin la !shad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa'i rgyu yang de yin pas na shes bya ba n,・ las'cf7in 
pa ・u /I de p111g zhe na ijes su dpag paste I zjes su dpag pa ston pa'i phyir ~'i ranどgidon z／ぷ
su dp,1g pa'i le ・u ni IJ・es su dpag pa ・o I de skad du gang gi phy/r zjes su dpag pa la b,ten nas I bcom ldan'das ky, 
hka ・ rigs pa dang ldan pa yin.J:!Yil gzlwn mu stegs pa dag gi ni ma yin no zhes bstan par'gyu「/oI de skacl du hshad 
pa ni ma111 pa g7/Jan y1i1 no /Izies su dpag pa de yang rang gi don gy,· リ•essu cfpag pa'i le ・ur ma171 par phye ba de bas 
na ~・; mng g,・don gyi des su dpag pa'i le ・u de nyid,tsod ngan Ian btab pa'i sgo nas s,)四l
mam par bshacl pa nyid yin no I PVT(Ne) 70b 7ff 
... 
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basis of his assertion in the statements by DharmakTrti himself戸Butin comparison with the 
religious school's interpretation we examine next, this assertion concerning the relationship 
between the inference and the Buddha as valid cognition seems to be quite characteristic of the 
philological school, especially of Sakyabuddhi 
2. The religious school's interpretation 
2.1. Prajfiakaragupta's approach 
In contrast with the commentaries by the philological school we examined above, the Pramii(la-
噸rtiki/a11kfiraof Prajiiakaragupta, the founder of the religious school, does not explicitly dis-
cuss the problem of the order of the chapters of the /知ll]§nav訂tika.It is quite natural in a 
sense, because Prajiiakaragupta does not comment on the Sviirthiinumfina-chapter and therefore 
has no occasion to explain the curious placement of the S噸dhfinumiina-chapterin the 
Pranlinavみtika.Nevertheless, we cannot say that Prajiiakaragupta is not interested in this 
problem at al and uncritically accepts the philological school's interpretation. 
Indeed, in the Pann初avfirtiki I a17k訂a,the Pran1ii{1asiddhi-chapter is located at the top. And 
it is not the case that the original second chapter automatically becomes the first chapter, as the 
result of the lack of the original first chapter. It is because he actually puts his own Mangala-
verse at the beginning of the Pramii(lasiddh1~chapter of his work after the model of Dignaga's 
and Dharmaki"rti's ・ one23 and moreover makes a paraphrase of the introduction of the 
Pramii(lasanwccaya as follows: 
"Here [in this work], a line praising [the Lord] is recited at the beginning of the 
treatise since the Lord became a means of valid cognition (pran1ii(labln1ta) through 
[his] perfection in cause and effect. It is because [the very Lord] is the purpose of 
the treatise. 19 24 
Here, Prajiiakaragupta shows the purpose of the whole of the work. For him, the purpose of the 
treatise is the Lord. And then, in order to explain the meaning of the word'who became a 
means of valid cognition'as the essential characteristic of the Lord, he begins to explain the 
definition of valid cognition. Thus, this introduction by Prajiiakaragupta shows the necessity 
that the Pramii(lasiddhi should be the first chapter in Prajiiakaragupta's own system. One could 
say, therefore, that Prajnakaragupta intentionally locates the Pramii(lasiddhi at the beginning of 
his work from his own philosophical viewpoint. And so far as this order of the chapters of the 
Pran]えnavirttikgJalpkぇi-ais an inevitable conclusion of Prajiiakaragupta's system, it is possible 
2 For example, Dharmak1rti states that the four noble truths are objects of the normal inference. Cf. PVSV I 08, 16f., 
se also PY 1284-5. 
2.l Cf. praminab/llIt§yaiagaddhitaighepl-anamya §えstresugat§ya tliyine/ 
kutaIKasambhrintajan§nukampayiipram§nasiddhi「vidhivadvidlnyate II  
pl―iya(l prastutavastuvistarabh.110 nek~yanta evoccakai「
vakt5rahpaI.amaIthasamgl.ahadI]lyiivyadhutaphalbrukI.am砂／
tenasmin vira/akmmavyapagamiid atyanta.focldl沿ncllyah 
dhany初初1vie/ad/沿tumuddhatadflly§Indh「(7sa171v1de c!Myate l/21 PV A 3,6-1 
The first verse is undoubtedly composed after the model of the Marigala-verse of the Prnmarasamuccaya. The second 
verse also seems to be composed after the model of Dharmak111i's second Marigala-verse of the Pmmarava1ttika-
sva Vltl. 
]4 Cf. 8[la bha&'avato hetuphala.sampa[ly;i pI-amanab/ll7latvena slolab/lclKinam s'aslI-idil. s'；isl;ilthalv/it. PVA 3,12f、
.dl「yangrab tu byed pa・; dang par 1gyu dang'brns bu phun su/l tslwgs pas !shad mar gyur pa nyid ky,:., bco/l ldan 
'das la bstucl pa b~jud pa nigus pa bskyed par bya ba ・;dun du ・o I PSV 14b2 
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to argue that he, as a commentator of the Prama9aviirtflka, may consider that the Pra111a9a-
siddhi should be the first chapter in Dharmakfrti's system also. In this sense, the following 
statement in the Pariirt／厄numana-chapterof the Pra111ii9av§rttikii/aq1kiira should not be over-
looked: 
"The Pariirt／だ'inumiinais stated immediately after the Sv.釘thanumana,because the 
Paばl.t／項numanapresupposes the Svarthanumana. 1125 
Here, he actually suggests that the Si-~釘thanumiina-chapter should be located immediately be-
fore the Paばrthanun厄na-chapter.However, this statement maybe does not concern the Pra111ふ
りav釘tika,but PranJB{Jasamuccaya, because Prajfiakaragupta refers to a sentence of the latter 
work immediately after this statement.2(lIn any case, his opinion on the problem of the order of 
the chapters of the Pramii9a varttika is not clear enough. This is the reason why there arose two 
different opinions regarding this problem in his followers. 
2.2. Jayanta's new interpretation 
It is Jayanta, a commentator of Prajfiakaragupta, who under the influence of the above-men-
tioned approach of Prajfiakaragupta first explicitly asserted that the Prama9asiddhi should be 
the first chapter of the Prama9aviirttika. We can find out his discussion about this issue in al of 
the three chapters of his commentary on the Pramii9avfirttikii/a1pkfira, the * Pran1ii9avii1thkふ
/a171kara/Tkii. A thorough explanation of his new interpretation can be found at the beginning of 
the Pramii{1asiddhたchapterof this work, in the folios De 2a2-4b3 of the Derge-edition. 
Therefore, I would mainly deal with this explanation in what follows. The description is not so 
long, but quite difficult to understand correctly, as I mentioned above. Nevertheless, we can 
realize at least that this description seems to consist of two parts. Namely, in the first half, he 
criticizes the philological school's interpretation that the Svfirtl沿numiinais the first chapter, and 
accordingly in the second half, he tries to explain the reason for his assertion that the Prama{Ja-
siddhi should be the first chapter. 27 First let us examine his criticism of the philological school's 
interpretation. 
2.2.1. Jayanta's criticism of the philological school's interpretation 
The main question, which Jayanta here poses, is whether the Pra111iil}avii1ttJka is really a com-
mentary on the Pran1iil}asa1nuccaya or not. Jayanta says: 
2'Cf. svii1thiinumiiniinantara1J1 parii,thiinumiinam ucyate, svii,thiinumiinapilrvakatviit pma,thiinumiinasya. PY A 467,4. 
A similar statement can be found in the piJrvapak$a of the fourth chapter of Sakyabuddhi's commentary (cf. de la'dir 
rang gi don gyi小essu dpag pa'i skabs su bab pa zhes bya bani mngon sum de ma thag tu bstan zin pa nyid kyi phyir 
ranggidon gyi'J.es su dpag pa・; skabs su bab pa yin par'gyur ro Ide sngar bstan zin pa zhes bya bani le'u dang par 
mlPVT(Ne) 252a4f.) [[Devendrabuddhi says:]'Between these, on the subject of the inference for onesel「.［One 
considers] that the Svii11hiinumiina should be the (next) subject, because [it] was stated [in the Pramiirasamuccaya] 
immediately after the Pratyak$a. [Devendrabuddhi answers to this question:]'[Dhannak1rti] exrlained it in advance.' 
Namely, in the first chapter.] Manorathanandin, who locates the Pramiirasidd/11~chapter at the top, states similarly at 
the beginning of the Pratyak$a-chapter of his commentai-y, the P1amiiravii1tt1kav1tti (cf. tatra svii,thiinumiinam 
id/in/-11 vaktavyam etatp伍vakatviitpara,thasya. PVV 282,4). 
2(‘Cf tatl.a paばl1hiinllllIiinamtu svadm傾lthapI.aka紐nam.PY A 467,S=PS 11 1 ab. [Between these [two infe「ences],
the inference for others reveals the object perceived by oneself [to others].] 
!_think it is also possible to consider these two pa,ts as the response to the former and the latter part, respectively, 
of Si"1kyabuddhi's statement in the P「am,iuas1dd/11~chapterof his co1rnnenta1'j we examined above 
一
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"With respect to this, one said:'there are living beings that take a wrong step of 
despising the teacher [Dignaga] who teaches right knowledge to those who have 
wrong knowledge as the cause of suffering. [Dharmakirti] wants to protect [the叫
with [his] compassion. [A叫 onthe ground of [this compassion] he writes the 
, 28 
乃amii9avarttikaas a commentary on the treatise of the [teacher Dignaga].,L() This 
[assertion] is [however] not right. There is no reliable evidence concerning this. It 
is because there is no statement:'I commented on the treatise [ of Dignaga].'Also 
[in case of the statement:]'his teaching', etc. [at the beginning of the Pramfi9avi111•一
.efcaya],29'he'means the Lord or his followers. He [i.e., DharmakTrti] does not ex-
plain his [i.e., Dignaga's] teaching."・'0 
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Jayanta eventually wants to assert that the Pramii9asiddhi is the first chapter. And this order is 
rather suitable to the tradition of the Pramii{wsamuccaya. In this sense, it seems to be curious 
that he asserts that the Pramii9aviirttika is not a commentary on the Pramii9asamuccaya. It is, 
however, quite understandable, if we remember the reason for which the philological school 
asserts that the Svarthiinumiina is the first chapter. In their interpretation, they presuppose that 
the Pram初avartflkais a commentary on the Pramii9asa111uccaya. Namely, Devendrabuddhi, 
and Sakyabuddhi as well, asserted that Dharmakirti established in advance the inference in his 
Prama{1aviirttika because the inference is the ground for the explanation of the Pra111a9asamu-
ccaya. 
Jayanta's argument for the assertion that the Pra111初aviirttJkais not necessarily a cornmen-
tary on the Pram初asamuccayais persuasive enough and significant in itself. For example, he 
argues as follows: 
"The definition of thesis (* pak~a) etc., which [DharrnakTrti] explains at a certain 
[place in his work], is, to be sure, an explanation of the meaning of the [Pra111ii9a-
samuccaya], because [Dignaga] also discussed [this is叫 inhis treatise. But 
[DharmakTrti] considers [Dignaga's stateme叫 asa mere guide. He did in that way 
[namely, presented his own teaching by utilizing Dignaga's statements], in order to 
explain [his own teaching] easily, but not in order to comment on his [i.e., Digna-
ga's] treatise. 1131 
As the present writer explained in another paper, DharmakTrti presents his new teaching for the 
definition of thesis by utilizing Dignaga's sentence of the definition tacitly.32 In this sense, we 
can say that Jayanta recognizes the relationship between the Pramauasamuccaya and the Pra-
2x It is not yet clear for me, who actualy made this ase1ion. It probably could be ascribed to a commentator of the 
philological school, namely Sakyabuddhi (cf. PVT 3a4-5b7; PVSVT 2,23-4,27). 
29 Cf. PVin I 30,1. Dharmottara apparently regards this'his'as'Dignaga's'(cf. PVinT(Dse) 2a5f.). 
3 (ICf. de la sdug bsngal gyi rgyurgyur pa・; log pa・; shes pa can la yang dag pa・; shes pa bstan pa dang'dn1 bar slob 
dron la bmyas pa・; kha na ma tho bas'khrul pa'i skye bo yangs su bskyang bar'dud pa・; thugs,jes de・; gzlwng gis 
bshad par gyur pa~ mdzad pa yin no zhes 7,er ba de ni mi rigs te /'di la ts had ma med do/とrang
gis phyir de'i gzhung la kho bos bshad ces bya ba'i tshig med pa'i phyir ro I de'i lugs 7,/,es bya ba la sogs pa yang/ 
de shes bya bani bcom ldan'das sam zjes su'd7,in pa po zhes bya ba ・;don to I de'i lugs ni ・c1,:, ston pa ma yin te / 
J(De) 2a3f. 
Cf. phyogs kyi mtshan ny,d la sogs pa gang du yang bstan pa de'i g7hung nytd la yang bzjod ra'i phyir de・; don 
'chad par byed la I deyang drangs pa kho nar dgongs pa ・o I bstan par sla ba'i phyir de ltar byas pa yin 幻~yide・, 
とヮhungbslwd ra'iphyir ni Ila yin no IJ(De) Jb2f. 
-~ Cf. Ono、M.(1986), "Dharmak1rti ni okeru shuch6-meidai no teigi ni tsuite [On the definition of thesis by 
Dhar11ak11i]", !HK 34/2, (109)-(112) 
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m初虹dtikaquite exactly. In fact, the Pramiil}avarttJka is not a mere commentary on the 
乃amiinasa m ucca va. y
Now, Jayanta concludes his criticism of the philological school's interpretation with the 
following statement 
"Because of the very above-mentioned reason, it is not [ right to say] that [Dharrna-
k「rti]explains the inference at first because [it] becomes a means of the explana-
tion for his [i.e., Dignaga's] treatise. "1・1 
Given this statement, it becomes clearer that Jayanta criticizes Sakyabuddhi's interpretation. It 
is because we can fi叫 outthe relatively uncommon expression'becomes a means (thabs su 
gyurpa)'in the very statement by Sakyabuddhi we examined above. 3 4 
2.2.2 . Jayanta's own interpretation 
On the other hand, concerning his own interpretation that the P闊mauasiddhishould be the first 
chapter, Jayanta attempts to confirm it on the basis of the following arguments. 
At first, he lays stress upon the superiority of the Buddha as valid cognition over the other 
means of valid cognition. He says: 
"[Only] the Buddha, who attained to complete enlightenment, the Lord, inscruta-
ble, who indicates righteousness a叫 unrighteousness,[ can] establish [ something], 
a叫 everyonedepends necessarily on him. Therefore, [the other means of valid 
cognition] which can establish [something] are also not right without depending on 
him. " 3 5 
According to Jayanta, only the Buddha, namely the omniscient being, is the ultimate means of 
val id cognition, and the other means of valid cognition such as the direct perception and the 
inference must depe叫 onit. Without the Buddha as valid cognition, the direct perception and 
the inference ultimately cannot be legitimated. Therefore, the Prmnauasiddhi-chapter, which 
proves that the Buddha is the one who became a means of valid cognition(pramauab/Juta), 
must be located at the top of the work. It is because the explanation of the Buddha as valid 
cognition must precede the explanations of al the other means of valid cognition. 
The second argument is so difficult that I can understand it only partially now. In this argu-
ment, Jayanta seems to justify his interpretation by means of relating the four chapters of the 
Pran1/i9aviirttJka with the five epithets of the Buddha in the Marigala-verse by Dignaga and 
Prajfiakaragupta, namely:'who became a means of valid cognition (pramauabht1ta)','who 
strives for the welfare of al living beings(j.'agaddhitai;;in)','the Teacher (siistri)','the Well-
gone (sugata)'and'the Saviour (tiiyin)'. Anyway, in this argument, Jayanta states a second 
reason the Pra1nii{msiddhi must be located at the top: 
l l Cf. de nyicl kyi phy,:「de'igzlwn!..rb.shad.． pa・; thabs su gyur nas,Jes su dpag pa dang par bshad pa ni ma yin no I 
.l(Dc)Jb4 
.¥ 4 Cf. de bHs na thabs su ;yur pa nyid kyi どphyir de nyid dang po「roampar gzhag pa yin no IPVT(Ne) 71 a6. See 
also surra note 21. In order to refer to Sakyabud<lhi's interpretation, Jayanta uses this expression again later. Cf. 
.l(Ne) 162f. See also inf,-H note 47 
¥ 9 Cf. y、‘Ing(1、‘I&rpal l(／70どspa'l sang.S Igya.s bcom /dan'（fa.S し•hosdnng clws nw yin pa stun par mdzad pa mam pat 
dpyad par bya ba ma yin pa sgrub par byed pa yin la de ny,d ni thams rnd ky,:c; bltos par bya ba yin pa'i phyir de la 
b/／（）ヽ pa/led pa,欧 rubpar byed pa yang rigs pa /Ila yin no IJ(De) 365f. 
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"Among these [three means of valid cognition], the direct perception is [ explained] 
at first because the production of the perfection for oneself is fundamental. By 
virtue of this [direct perception], the inference is also valid cognition. Therefore, 
some verbal behaviour is designated [ as'the inference'for others] metaphorically, 
because [this behaviour results fro叫 onlyremembering [the content of the infer-
ence for onesel月thatthe logical reason is pervaded by a certain [ object] to be es-
tablished. Therefore, [Prajn.akaragupta] wants to establish that'the Pariirthiinu-
miina is [stated] immediately after the Sv.みthiinwniina',and explains it [ with the 
epithet:]'the Saviour'. 
Without a common definition to these al three means of valid cognition, one [ c叫
not recognize that the Veda is not a means of valid cognition because it does not 
satisfy the definition [of valid cognition]. Therefore, in order to establish the 
common definition, [Prajnakaragupta] explains this [common definition] in the 
first chapter [concerning the epithet:]'one who became valid cognition'."3(） 
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Here, Jayanta asserts that the common definition to the three means of valid cognition, namely 
the direct perception, the inference for oneself and the inference for others, must be established 
before explaining those means of valid cognition individually, because one cannot determine 
whether a means of cognition is valid or not without the common definition. It is the reason 
why the Pra111ii9asiddhi-chapter, which explains the Buddha as valid cognition and the common 
definition of valid cognition, must precede other chapters explaining those means of valid 
cognition individually. This argument was regarded by later thinkers as a strong confirmation 
for the assertion that the Pramarasiddhi should be the first chapter of the Pra111ii9aviirttika. 
Yamari, who later criticizes Jayanta's interpretation, takes first this argument as a target of his 
criticism and refutes it.37 Later Tibetan scholars also regard this argument as decisive for 
Jayanta.・ 18 
At last, he explains the order of the four chapters of the Pa11]沿・uaviirttika as follows: 
"One should rather say: the Lord, whose nature is both conventional and ultimate, 
and who removes misunderstanding by others, should be established here [at first]. 
1(.Cf. de la rang gi don phul du byung ba 1tsa ba yin pa・; phyir thog mar mngon sum mo Ide・; dbang Idu gyur pa・; 
/j•es su dpag pa yang !shad ma yin pas bsgrub byaji /ta bas khyab pa・;,tags dran par byed pa ny1d kho nas tshig gi 
tha snyad la nye bar sbyor ba ・;pl，y,i・ rang gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i'og tu gzhan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa 
bsgrub par'dud nas de bstan pa ni skyob la zhes bya ba ・o I tshad ma gsum po'di'iyang spy;・; mtshan nyid med na I 
rig byed la sogs pa !shad ma ma yin pa mtshan ny,d dang bra/ ba can mi 10.どspa'iphyi「!shadma spyi'i mtshan ny,d 
悶btu sgrub pa'iphyir le'u dang paste de bstan pa ni tshad mar gyur pa zhes bya ba ・o I J(De) 4a4f. 
J? Cf. gal te de /ta na yang bar du bstan pa'i phyir'di ci/tar ngag dang po yin zhe na I'di la控四店nare況正
mtshan nvid med oar ni I til!bved la SOl.!S oa !shad ma ma v,n oa la mtshan nvid mi 101.!s oa'i ohv1i-sovi'i mtshan 
nyid brjod pa ・;phy,i・ le'u dan.l! po ・o I de nas ran1.; _1.;i don'ohel ba'i,tsa bar ;.:yur bas mngon sum.l!Yi le ・u ・o I ranf.{ 
don ;.:yi 1/es su dpa;.: pa ni 111_1.;on sum la ra;.: las oa ・;tshad ma vin oas 111;.:on sum ;.:y1s迦 tu・o I de・; de ma tha_1.; tu 
_'di la/ tfsod p~ zer ro /I de'i !]・es su,jod 
par byed pa gzhan dag kyang yod pa ni ~ la sogs pan,・ le ・u ・; go rim la "khrul pa yin te I slob dpon gyi 
リ・essu dpag pa dang por bshad pa ni dka'i ba'i phyir Izhes skangs par byed do Ide la'dir rigs pa ya! btlr dor bar 11 
nus pas rnng zing btjod do IY(Phe) 179a6. Here、thepurvapak~a (underlined) is this second argument by Jayanta 
On the other hand, Yamari's following statement seems to be a criticism of Jayanta's first argument: rig pa nytd yid 
ches ra'i rgyu yin no zhe na/go rim de mi rigs pa nyid yin pa ni bla'o I slob clpon gyi ma yin pa ni ma yin te I skyes 
bu !shad ma zhes bya ba'i sgrub par byed pa ni slob dpon gyi bshed par yang ma yin no Ing pa nyid la yang slob 
dpor八,;yis-yinra nyid bka'bc1 c/yod de IY(Phe) 179b5ff. 
ix For examrle, se dGe'dun grub's statement in his Tshad ma'i bstan bcos chen po Rigs pa'i rgyan. See Kimura 
1989: 19f. 
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[The Lord] perceives the highest entire non-duality, because [he] attains the per-
fection of the virtues by means of entirely removing whole impurity accompanied 
with unconscious impressions. Therefore, it is the ultimate truth that his nature is 
the direct perception. Also in view of the conventional [truth], [ cognition] is valid, 
which is consistent with the [direct perception by the Lord]. In order to recognize 
it, (Dharmakfrti) distinctively explains the inference for oneself and for others, 
whose natures are conceptual cognition and words [respectively], which are not 
inconsistent with the [direct perception by the Lord]. 9 9.19 
2.2.3. The origin of Jayanta's interpretation 
Thus, Jayanta's new interpretation of the order of the chapters of the Pra111初av釘ttikahas a 
theoretical background; it is not a casual idea. Now, can we ascribe this new interpretation by 
Jayanta entirely to his originality? In my opinion, the second argument, which later scholars 
regard as Jayanta's own idea, and for that matter the first argument as well, are not necessarily 
original to Jayanta. It is because the fundamental idea of his arguments can be traced back to 
the statements of his great predecessor, Prajnakaragupta. 
4(） 
As for the first argument, which asserts the superiority of the Buddha as valid cognition, 
Jayanta probably derives his idea from Prajnakaragupta's interpretation of omniscience. Pra-
j韮karaguptasays as follows: 
"For the very reason, the misunderstanding is removed only by the treatise that the 
omniscient being revealed, not by other [treatises]. In view of this, only the word 
of the omniscient being is valid cognition. Therefore, ultimately only the cognition 
by the omniscient being is valid cognition, [but the cognition] by others is not. [It 
is] the ultimate truth. <Other [cognition such as the direct perception] is 
[ultimately] not valid, because it is impossible [for the cognition] to pervade its 
object. [And] the non-pervading cognition cannot grasp the connection with the ef-
fect, etc.> For the causality accompanied by [the cognition] pervading space and 
time, [namely] the past, the future and the present, is by no means the object of the 
cognition by the non-omniscient being, because the direct perception grasps only 
present and near space, and because the inference has no place for [the object of 
the direct perception]. [Now] how can the omniscience of the author of treatises be 
recognized? We will explain it later. 9 9 4 1 
39 Cf. gzhan yang beam ldan'das kun rdzob dang don dam pa・; ngo bo gzhan gyi'khrul pa sel ba'dir bsgrub par bya 
ste / bag chags dang bcas pa・; dri ma thams cad rab tu spangs pa・; phyiryon tan phun sum tshogs pa bmyes pas plwl 
du byung ba dngos po ma /us pa gnyis su med par thugs su chud pa・; phyir mngon sum pa'i bdag nyid can ni don 
dam par ro I kun rdzob tu yang de dang,Jes su mtlwn pa ny,d kyi tshad ma yin par shes pa・; don du de la'khrul ba 
med pa ・;mam par,tog pa danとrtshig gi ngo bo rang gi don dang gzhan gyi don gyi,Jes su dpag pa・; dbye bas bstan 
te l.l(De) 4a7f. 
41 Prof. Nagasaki has already assumed in his a1ticle that Jina (=Jayanta) followed Prajiakaragupta's criticism of the 
philosophical school (cf. Nagasaki 1 %9: 28). 
41 Cf.ata eva.efastreraiva sarv,!f1oktena moho niva,tate. niinyenety anena prakareua sarvaj,,avacanam eva pramaram 
il palam釦 hata(lsarvajnaj祁nameva pmmiiram, 1c1param it i param釘thah
anyasya na pl.am初alvamprameylivyiptisambha1/il/avyipin、ina kiilyiidisambandha.sya pangrahah (222) 
k;ilyaki98[labh§vo hy al「Kin；むalaval.tanlinakilade.{avyipl.9ihacalyall7pona khalv asal I13/．li3/.liinasya Vl:saya[7, vala-
11in郎anmihilade¢fanlitragrahan和[pl.alyaksasylinll]、1nasyac,ina vaばliI.sa几 3/．natva11kathatf1 jnayate.efastmkiimsya 
el. tad uta,at,a vak,yima(1. PV A 29ぶ26-31 
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Here, Prajiiakaragupta explains the fundamental ity of omniscience in his epistemological sys-
tern. According to him, ultimately only omniscience, which can pervade the whole time and 
space, can recognize causality fully. And the inference, whose basis is the invariable concomi-
tance, depends on the causality. Therefore, the inference ultimately must presuppose the om-
niscient being, the Buddha as valid cognition.42 I think, Jayanta presents his first argument on 
the basis of this idea of Prajfiakaragupta.4・1 
Concerning Jayanta's second argument, which asserts that the common definition must pre-
cede an explanation of the direct perception a叫 theinference, we can also find the origin of 
this argument in Prajfiakaragupta's statement. At the beginning of the Pratyak$a-chapter of his 
Pra1na1Javiirttikala1J1kfira he says as follows: 
"After [DharmakTrti] explained the common definition in this way [in the Pramふ
uasiddh1~chapter], he has talked about particular definitions, [following Dignaga's 
statement:]'the direct perception and the inference are valid cognition,.. ,4 145 
This statement probably leads to Jayanta's second argument. Jayanta really suggests that he 
derives his second argument from Prajfiakaragupta's statement. Jayanta says in the Pratyak筵
chapter of his commentary as follows: 
"The commentator and the listener4(i［explained as follows:]'[Dharmak廿ti]ex-
plains the inference in the first chapter, which becomes a means of the explanation 
of the treatise by the teacher [Dignaga]. [In] the second chapter [he] establishes 
valid cognition by [the explanation of] the first half of the verse:'one who became 
valid cognition'[etc.]. [In] the third [chapter] [he] explains the direct perception.' 
[But Prajnakaragupta] considers [it] as absurd, because [this] does not explain the 
[true] meaning [ of the order of the chapters]. Therefore, he says:'the common 
definition in this way'. '147 
Namely, according to Jayanta, in the statement:'after [DharmakTrti] explained the common 
definition in this way', Prajfiakaragupta asserts that the philological school's interpretation of 
the order of the chapters is wrong and the PramfiIJasiddhi should be the first chapter of the 
Pra1na1Ja virtika. 
In addition to these points, it is also noteworthy that Jayanta refers in his second argument to 
Prajfiakaragupta's statement in the fourth chapter of his Pramii1Javarttikala171kfira, which sug-
4 2 According to Prof. Nagin J. Shah, the author of the Siddhiviniscayaf,-ka regards Prajriakaragupta as the Buddhist 
representative who ase1ted that the yogic perception is the means of cognising the invariable concomitance. See 
Shah、S.Nag in(1967), Akala,ika's criticism of DhannakT,ti's Philosophy -a Study-, Ahmedabad, 263. 
4 3 Strictly speaking, the concept of the omniscient being which Prajnakaragupta presents here might correspond to 
the sarvasarv<!itia, whereas Jayanta seems to describe the Buddha as the praclhina1th<!it1a in his statement (cf. sup,a 
note 35). 
4 Cf . mngon sum dang ni,Jes su dpag Itshad ma ・oPS I b3
Cf. eva11 samiinyalak~a[lam abhidhiiya vise\mlak~a[lam a/Ja :pratyak~am anumanaf/1 ca pramape. PVA 169,3. 
4('These expressions _are not clear for me. I tentatively assume that'the commentator ('ch.1d pa po)'and'the listener 
(nyan pa pa)'mean Sakyabuddhi and Devendrabu<ldl1i respectively 
47 Cf. slob clpon gy,匹hung'c/wdpa'i !/Jabs sugyur pa・; le ・u dang pus ni~jes su dpag pa'c/1ad I le・u訊'nyispatshad 
ma yang dag ces bya ba'its/Jig su bead pa phyed ky,: ni !shad ma gmb pa Igsum pa ni mngun sum'c/1ad pa yin nu 
7/Jes d1ad pa po clang nyan pa pa sbyo「rarbyed pa ma yin te I dun mngun par ma bリuclpa・; phyir ro 7hes bya ba ・,
如喫',pas I deIt紅 spyi'imtshan nyid ces bya ba smus so I J(Ne) I b2f. 
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gests that the Svarthanumana should be located immediately before the Paばrthanun1ana-chap-
ter 4X 
As shown above, Jayanta's new interpretation depends heavily on Prajnakaragupta's state-
rnents. We can say that Jayanta's interpretation that the Pra1nii{Jasiddhi should be the first 
chapter is not necessarily original to him, but derives from Prajnakaragupta's idea. We recog-
血 ethat Prajnakaragupta plays an important role in Jayanta's new interpretation. But Praj祠
karagupta's suggestions are fragmentary at the most. It is Jayanta who collects these sugges-
tions and constructs a concrete interpretation regarding the order of the chapters of the 
加 177取78噸rtika.In this sense, the main advocate of the assertion that the Pram初asiddhi
should be the first chapter is none other than Jayanta. 
2.3. Yamari and Ravigupta's view 
Jayanta's new interpretation was criticized at great length by Yarnari, the second commentator 
of Prajnakaragupta.49 An interesting question is this: Why does Yamari, who seems to be an 
orthodox successor of Prajnakaragupta's thought, raise an objection to.Jayanta's new interpre-
tation, which derives from Prajnakaragupta's new interpretation of Dharmakfrti's philosophy? A 
detailed investigation of this question must be left for future research, because Yamari's 
criticism of Jayanta's view is very comprehensive and elaborate. We can say at least that 
Yamari, an<l Ravigupta as well, have a different opinion from scholars of the philological 
school with respect to the reason why the S砥rthiinumiinais the first chapter, although they 
generally follow the philological school's view on the order of the chapters. For example, 
Yamari says: 
"As for the four noble truths, which will be explained [later], one cannot easily 
understand [them] without the explanation of the inference. Therefore, it is right to 
explain the inference at first [in the Prmn、7nav§rttika]．＂5(）
Ravigupta states similarly: 
"In this way, (Dharmakfrti) explains the Mangala-verse [of the P「am初asmnucca-
ya] clearly in the second chapter [ of the I'「am取1aviirthka],because, in order to 
strive for the four noble truths, these [four noble truths] should be explained, after 
the inference was established [at the Svart／沼nul]］ina]．1151 
Thus, in both cases, the reason why the Svartl沿numiina-chapteris located at the top is that the 
4X See supra note 25; 36 
49 Cf. Y(Phe) 179a6-191a7. For examrle, Yamari refers to the name'Jayanta'in the following: "Therefore, the 
teacher Devendrabuddhi did not misunderstand. The rejection by Jayanta and his epigones is not necessary at al 
Therefore, it is best to [consider the traditional order] as [the order] by the teacher [Dharmakfrti himself]." (cf. de・, 
phyir~ ・khrul pa ma yin no II~ dang des yangs su zin pa・; bshad pa byed pa dag Ian 
dgus pa yang med do!/des na slob d1701 gyi yin pa mchog go IY(Phe) 181 a6f.); "It is not possible to say that 
[ Praj nakaragu pta]、intendingto exrlain the very Pran泊nasiddh,~chapters at the tor of the whole [work], talks about 
the very rurpose [of the treatise here], because Jayanta's opinion was refuted co111rrehensively." (cf. tshad ma grub 
pa・, le ・u nyid thams cad kyi dang par bstan pa・; bsam pas gtso bo ・;dun nyid du bdod 17a yin no 7,/,es kyang smra bar 
n,i nus te I~·; ・c1od pa rgya cher sun phyung pa'i phyi「,vlY(Phe)l97b7)
C f.chad p、‘lLryll ba.phags pa'l bden pa b7hi po rnams Sl [/•CS Sl (/1ag pa bstan p、,Ima gtogs (corrected : Ifogs) 
par bde blag du mi,togs pa ・;phyir ~jcs su drag pa dang pur bshad pa ・;rigs so I Y (Phe) 191 a 1 f 
Cf. de /tar'p/,aどspa・;bden pa b7hi la jug pa yin pa'i phyi「りtssu dpag pa mam paI加hagnas de nyid bstan pm 
b.yaba.l ph.yl /c.lとrn.yISpas phy、?g・r`、lwlba ・;tshigs su bead 17a gsal bar bshacl par mcf7acf du IR 293b2f 
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knowledge of the inference is indispensable to understanding the four noble truths. 52 In the case 
of the philological school, the Sv'.みthinumぇnamust be located at the top basically because the 
inference is the ground for explaining the whole of the P1c11nii1Jasa1nuccaya. Sakyabuddhi, to be 
sure, also asserted that the Sviirthiinumiina is at the top because the inference is the ground for 
explaining'the Buddha's word'叫 chas the four noble truths. For him, however, the inference 
as valid cognition is more fundamental than the Buddha's word as valid cognition. Inthe case 
of Yamari and Ravigupta, the situation of these two means of valid cognition seems to be re-
versed. For these two thinkers, the inference must be explained in advance in order to under-
stand the four noble truths as the Buddha's word, and the Buddha as valid cognition is, of 
course, more fundamental than the inference as valid cognition. In this point, we probably 
could recognize a difference between Sakyabuddhi's view and Yamari's/Ravigupta's view. 53 
3. Conclusion 
In the foregoing sections, we have sketched out the development of the interpretation of the 
order of the chapters of the Pramii9aviirttJka among the Indian Dharmakfrti-commentators. We 
have examined the philological school's interpretation, Jayanta's criticism of the philological 
school's interpretation, and Jayanta's new interpretation and its origin. Finally, I will summarize 
this paper, and make an additional remark: 
It is Jayanta, who first explicitly asserted that the Pram初asiddhishould be the first chapter 
of the Pramii9a virtika. He criticizes Sakyabuddhi's interpretation and presents his new inter-
pretation. Jayanta's interpretation, however, depends heavily on Prajiiakaragupta's idea. In this 
sense, Jayanta's interpretation can be regarded as a further extension of Prajfiakaragupta's new 
interpretation o「DharmakJrti'sphilosophy. 
In view of Prajiiakaragupta's interpretation of the Buddha as valid cognition, which is an im-
portant factor of Jayanta's new interpretation, the school Prajiiakaragupta founded is appro-
priately referred to as'the religious school'. In view of Yamari's and Ravigupta's interpre-
tation, which seemingly follows the philological school's opinion, we can ascertain that their 
interpretation is essentially different from the philological school's interpretation and is suitable 
to be designated as'religious'. Thus, it is quite appropriate, following Prof. Stcherbatsky, to 
designate the school, which Prajfiakaragupta founded, and to which Ravigupta, Jayanta and 
Yamari belong, as'the religious school', in contrast with the school to which Devendrabuddhi 
and Sakyabuddhi belong. 
9 2 According to Prof. Kuijp、Gorarn pa thinks that Yam和i'sand Ravigupta's opinions are found in their 
interpretation on Dharmak11ti's statement'a1t/Jiina1t/Javivecanasya'(cf. Kuijp 1979). But I could not find the 
corresponding statements in their commentaries. Neve1theless, it is sure that their opinions correspond to one of the 
six interretations concerning'mthinartha`、whichKarr:iakagomin enumerates (cf. PVSV丁7、23-27).I would like to 
thank Prof. Shoryu Katsura、whokindly informed me of this passage of thePVSV丁
q I think it is possible to designate Yamari's and Ravigupta's view as'religico-metaphy咄ical‘、asProf. Kuijp did. Cf. 
Kuijp 1979: 17f. 
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